

authorized purpose, but is motivated by an ulterior, disguised purpose which is not authorized by law.” Such action on the part of a municipality constitutes bad faith. The lower court held that when the real purpose of condemnation is to prevent a proposed development, the condemnation is for an invalid purpose and may be set aside.

The lower court concluded that Mt. Laurel’s real purpose in condemning the property was to prevent Mipro’s residential development, contrary to the stated public purpose of taking the property for passive open space. The Township failed to demonstrate any real need for more open space. Moreover, the statutes relied on by Mt. Laurel did not justify the taking. Those statutes, while establishing a strong public policy encouraging the acquisition and preservation of lands by municipalities, merely act as funding mechanisms to assist municipalities in advancing those policies. The lower court stated that “those laws do not in any way supercede the Municipal Land Use Law and the Eminent Domain Act of 1971. Condemnation cannot replace zoning and planning.”

The lower court also contrasted another decision upholding condemnation where a municipality included an open space and recreational element in its Master Plan which identified the property in question as a potential open-space acquisition site. Here, no such plan existed and Mt. Laurel had not conducted any study to evaluate whether a need for open space or recreational areas existed.

The Appellate Division reversed, holding that a municipality has statutory authority to condemn property for open space and that the selection of properties for open space acquisition in order to stop planned residential developments is not an improper use of the power of eminent domain. The court recited several statutes that allow a municipality to use eminent domain to acquire land for open space preservation. It rejected Mipro’s argument that this power is limited to instances where a municipality has a plan to put the land to active recreational use. The court recognized conservation of land for open space as a public use, and a plan for active use of the land is not required to demonstrate a “need” for the acquisition. “Open space acquisition may serve the public interest not only by setting aside land for potential future recreational uses but also by preventing development.”

The court also rejected the argument that condemnation of the site for open space preservation was impermissible under the statutory authority relied on by Mt. Laurel and the court because the property was not included in an area designated for open space under the Township’s master plan. The court held that even though the master plan did not identify the site for open space, Mt. Laurel had authority to condemn the site for open space because it obtained Green Acres funding for the acquisition. The Green Acres funding process “reflects a finding by the Green Acres Program that the Mipro site is suitable for open space acquisition.”

The court also concluded that the Township’s motive of stopping the Mipro development did not constitute fraud, bad faith, or manifest abuse. Concerns that “residential development would aggravate traffic congestion and pollution problems in the municipality and impose added stress on its school system and other municipal services” are valid public policy considerations according to the Court. The court also stated that a different result may have been reached if the proposed development was not a single family residential development, but a development that implicated other significant public interests such as a multi-family affordable housing development or assisted living facility.

This decision allows townships to utilize condemnation solely as an anti-development tool. Townships may use open space condemnation to target and stop development, although they would be required to pay compensation, but not lost profits, for the taking.

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COURT UPHOLDS AUTOMATIC APPROVAL PROVISION OF COUNTY PLANNING ACT

South Plainfield Properties v. Middlesex County Planning Board

In this case, the Appellate Division upheld a determination that the Middlesex County Planning Board was deemed to have granted subdivision and site plan approval for a Target Store based on its failure to act on an application within applicable statutory time frames. The County Planning Act requires county planning board approval of subdivision and site plan applications that affect county roads or drainage facilities. N.J.S.A. 40:27-6.2. The statute provides that an application for county approval will be deemed approved if the county planning board fails to take action within 30 days of receipt of the application from the municipality. N.J.S.A. 40:27-6.3, 6.7.

Here, the County's failure to act on plaintiff's site plan and subdivision application within the required time frame was found to constitute automatic approval of the applications. The court found that the County Planning Board's adoption of a resolution postponing all action on the applications for a six-month time frame following the plaintiff's refusal to consent to additional adjournments of the County review was the epitome of the "evil" of municipal inaction and inattention that the statute was designed to remedy. The courts have loosely enforced statutory automatic approval provisions. This is particularly true where delay in municipal action is the result of some technical defect or where it involves some strong public interest concern involving the proposed development. But here, the Court "found that the inaction on the part of the county planning board was a 'clear showing of purposeful delay', precisely the conduct that the automatic approval provision was designed to prevent."

This is an important recognition of the enforceability of statutory "deemer" provisions.

DENIAL OF SUBDIVISION REVERSED

Sellick v. Borough of Bradley Beach

An ordinance that lacks any substantive standards improperly grants a municipality with arbitrary enforcement powers in violation of the MLUL.

Plaintiff submitted an application to subdivide her existing residential property into three lots. The application met the municipality's frontage and width requirements, and no variances were required. But the Borough denied the application relying on a "catch-all" parking ordinance governing off-street parking.

The Appellate Division reversed the denial of subdivision approval, finding that the "catch-all" parking ordinance was standardless and improperly granted the Board with unfettered discretion. The "catch-all" provision applied "as specified by the Borough Planning Board." The Court found that the Ordinance lacked standards, was vague and attempted to "improperly imbue the Board with the arbitrary power to dictate parking requirements on an ad hoc basis." By failing to include any standards in the "catch-all" provision, the municipality "failed to give its citizens notice of what is expected" and transferred its police power to the Board. As the Board relied on the standardless ordinance to deny the application, its action was arbitrary and capricious.

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VACATION OF PUBLIC STREETS

GDT, LLC v. Township of Bordentown

In this case, the Appellate Division held that members of the public do not have a right to demand that a municipality take action to vacate public streets. The vacation of public streets is a discretionary act of a public body.

Plaintiff filed suit to force the Bordentown Township Committee to vacate two paper streets running through plaintiff's property. Plaintiff's local development approval, for operation of a convenience store with gas pumps, was conditioned upon the vacation of the two paper streets running through its property. Vacation of the paper streets was required to consolidate the property into a single parcel for development.

The Township Committee refused the plaintiff's request to vacate the paper streets, asserting it was considering conversion of the area to open space. The Court confirmed that vacation of public streets is a discretionary function of local government, to be achieved by adoption of an ordinance, based upon the best interests of the public. It is important that property owners seeking site plan or subdivision approval understand the limitations of conditional approvals in this context.

HACKENSACK MEADOWLANDS DISTRICT

Infinity Broadcasting Corporation v. New Jersey Meadowlands Commission

The Appellate Division declined a request to consider a taking claim involving the New Jersey Meadowlands Commission, finding such claims are required to be filed as an action in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division.

The case involved plaintiffs' appeal from resolutions adopted by the Meadowlands Commission amending a redevelopment agreement with a third-party that related to a portion of the Hackensack Meadowlands District. The plaintiffs owned property within the District bordering the redevelopment area. They complained that the proposed project would interfere with broadcasts from their radio station tower operated on the property. Among other arguments, plaintiffs asserted the resolution violated basic principles of land use, and that the Commission's action constituted a taking of their property because the Commission failed to ensure the absence of inference with the radio signals.

As the Meadowlands Commission is a State agency, plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Appellate Division, but sought a remand to the Law Division for development of a record and decision. The Appellate Division agreed that "consideration of the land use and taking issues would be inappropriate on the record." While the Commission is a State agency, it exercises land use authority on a local basis and, therefore, its actions must be challenged in a proceeding in lieu of prerogative writs filed in the Law Division.

This information is not to be construed as legal advice. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact any of the following attorneys:

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